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These papers show us several horizons, one deep inside the brain, one 
beyond the ivory tower, and a third as wide as the ecosphere. All offer 
promising agendas, all challenge our habitual modes of scholarship, and 
all make me somewhat uneasy, in different but not unrelated ways. 
Possibly I’m simply not up to their challenges. In any case, this response 
may come across as curmudgeon-ish, but I offer it in the spirit of 
provoking discussion.  
Ceccarelli: The Horizon of External Audiences, 
The Goal of Influence 
Leah Ceccarelli challenges us to leave the curriculum vitae 
contemplativum for the CV activum. Perhaps we have nothing to lose but 
our ineffectual irrelevance, low status, and inability to procure external 
funding and thereby to participate fully in the twenty-first century 
research university and make our deans happy. Indeed, some rhetoricians 
of science have made important strides in this direction, several of whom 
were in the room with us during the panels (David Berube, Celeste 
Condit, Carl Herndl, Bill Kinsella). The changing nature of public support 
for higher education and the recent enthusiasm for “engaged scholarship” 
make Ceccarelli’s challenge timely and relevant.  
Those of us grounded in the humanities may be reluctant to undertake 
such engagement. Some time ago in a study of the characteristic topoi of 
literary criticism, Fahnestock and Secor (1991) identified the contemptus 
mundi topos, and I think it’s fair to say that this topos infects much of the 
scholarship of the humanities, including that of rhetoric of science. Our 
characteristic positionality as critics, objectifying and evaluating the 
discourse of others, invites us to a kind of contempt, perhaps one of our 
occupational psychoses. Can we retain the critical position and lose the 
psychosis? Can we “shift from understanding to action” (Ceccarelli, this 
issue) and retain the critical position? Should rhetoric give up the critical 
position and adopt a more “affirmative” one (Muckelbauer, 2008)?  
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One mode of engagement with public audiences is what is often called 
“public intellectual” work. Nathan Crick (2006) has shown how difficult it 
has been to conceive of this work in a way that is rhetorically informed. 
Intellectuals, he notes, are usually “left with the unhappy choice of either 
sending press releases from the Ivory Tower or abandoning the tower 
completely for ‘active participation in practical life’” (p. 130). His solution 
may not satisfy someone looking for any immediate “shift from 
understanding to action” (Ceccarelli, this issue). Conceiving of public 
intellectuals as “those who react to the problems of their sociohistorical 
situation by creating enduring works that broadly influence cultural 
habits and institutional practices,” that is, by aiming to “change the world 
through the transformative power of ideas” (p. 131), Crick proposes that 
the audience for such work must be considered in the long term; thus, 
while an initial audience may be opinion leaders, the ideas “work their 
way into the culture over time . . . [and] begin to take on a life of their 
own” (p. 136), and their real audiences are not necessarily either 
immediate or proximate.  
Many of us find the most congenial mode of engagement with broader 
audiences to be teaching, and those of us in departments of English play 
this role a bit differently from those in Communication because our 
teaching tradition has emphasized production over criticism, with our 
many courses in technical and scientific communication designed to help 
engineers and scientists become more effective communicators in their 
future professional roles. But the question we have always faced in this 
instructional setting is exactly the question at hand: where do standards 
come from? Do they come from rhetorica utens, that is, practices that 
may be widely used yet ineffective, or from rhetorica docens, that is, 
precepts and theories drawn from grammar, rhetoric, organizational 
communication, and elsewhere (Miller, 1989)? Academic inquiries into 
organizationally sanctioned practices often find that what is derided as 
“bad writing” is the rhetorically obvious result of power and status 
differentials or disparate professional cultures; these conditions make 
improvement in rhetorical performance difficult to achieve without social 
or organizational change (e.g., Brown & Herndl, 1986; Schryer, 2000).  
By the same token, Ceccarelli points out that the two areas where we 
may have the most lasting effects—teaching and extradisciplinary 
service—constitute  “unrewarded work” in the academy (this issue). The 
current pressures for accountability and outcomes assessment in higher 
education may produce the organizational change needed to reward this 
work, and such change could do more to reposition the humanities than 
any concerted effort by ARST.  
Harris: The Horizon of the Brain, The Goal of 
Scientific Understanding 
Randy Harris points us toward a horizon in the opposite direction: how to 
move from uninformed action to better understanding. The “snake-oil” of 
cognitive science will help us understand persuasion better, as distinct 
from the teaching tradition, which has spent a couple of millennia trying 
to help us “achieve persuasion” (this issue). This sounds benign: an 
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approach to understanding that looks to brain-work, rather than to 
contemptuous criticism or to a pedagogy of knacks. The brain provides 
the warrant for the claim of universality and thus for rhetoric as science.  
Look closely at the way this argument develops: it hooks onto a figure, 
a metaphor of a fluid in grooves. Harris quotes Sapir to the effect that 
language “flows” in “well-worn grooves of expression” 
(this issue) however, his own claim is that “rhetorical 
figures operate in the grooves of the mind” (this issue). 
This turns Sapir’s observation about the conceptual 
affordances of different languages into a claim that 
brings vividly to mind the grooves and folds of the 
human brain, a new and somewhat alarming form of 
rhetorical materialism, as the metaphor takes on 
metonymic power. Harris’s examples are persuasive 
(and seem similar to Gestalt theory): 
repetition, edges, contrast, etc., are central 
to the human perceptual (and thus 
conceptual?) system, and linguistic 
expressions that flow in these grooves are 
more likely to be not just comprehended 
but believed.  
And then what? If, in the pursuit of scientific understanding and in 
escape from weakly warranted pedagogy, we can establish rhetoric as 
cognitive and thereby understand it better (as a science), then we are 
faced exactly with the situation that Ceccarelli has presented to us: What 
do we do with this knowledge? It should inform our teaching, surely, and 
it should allow us to help ensure that correct judgments are formed about 
the true and the just (Aristotle, 2007, p. 1.1.12), particularly, in the 
present case, about scientific truths.  
Harris acknowledges Plato’s concern, “that being directed in a series 
of movements by the ‘form’ will get us moving with the ‘matter’ as well” 
(this issue), i.e., that we will become puppets in the hands of eloquence, 
or, perhaps, of glib hucksterism. But if “the form of signification 
profoundly affects the response of human organisms” (this issue), then 
the ultimate promise of cognitive rhetoric is that we can learn to use form 
to control other humans. This has been the rhetorical dream1: it’s what 
some thought the sophists were selling. It’s what the advertising industry 
and political campaign consultants are selling. My question is how 
distinct “the impulse to understand persuasion and the impulse to 
achieve persuasion” (this issue) can be. From knowledge to power is, as 
Francis Bacon saw, but a short step, and knowledge of the means to 
achieve persuasion is but a short step away from coercion. And this raises 
again the question about whether the distinction between basic and 
applied research can be sustained.  
Harris assures us that he is not claiming that there are “laws of 
suasion” (this issue). But if cognitive linguistics becomes cognitive 
                                                        
1 Note to Harris: Sorry my intended irony wasn’t apparent here.  
Figure 1. The Brain. From  
Wikimedia Commons, 
http://commons.wikimedia
.org/wiki/File:Human_brai
n.png. 
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rhetoric, if the science of rhetoric that Socrates outlined for Phaedrus 
finally becomes realized, how credible will that disclaimer be? Is any of 
this good reason for refraining from a research program? Can we ever 
justify turning away from knowledge? I’m not prepared to answer these 
questions, but only to suggest that Harris’s research program should 
entail an equally ambitious inquiry into ethical obligations. Or perhaps, as 
I have speculated elsewhere, mutual knowledge of the mechanisms of 
influence will simply cancel out their power, leaving us trusting each 
other that much less (Miller, 2010).  
Herndl: The Horizon of the Non-Modern and 
Post-Normal, The Goal of a Sustainable Planet 
Following Latour, Carl Herndl focuses our disciplinary attention on 
problems of the greatest practical import: the sustainability of the global 
ecosystem, including human and other life forms. And he invites us to 
follow him into the kinds of collaborative engagement that he has been 
able to pursue at the University of South Florida. Like Ceccarelli and 
Harris, Herndl wants the work of ARST to make a difference in the world, 
but his particular proposal is that we “move from talking about science to 
doing science” (this issue). The trail he is blazing involves direct alliances 
with scientists in both institutional and intellectual senses.  
Perhaps Latour is the right leader to be following down this trail, as he 
has directly engaged multiple times with the practices of scientists and 
technical people. And his work aims at both understanding and action, at 
talking about and doing. Perhaps Latour can maintain a stance of critical 
observation and at the same time intervene to improve the practices 
under observation. But I wish that someone would explain to Latour how 
the “uninterrupted chain of very small transformations” (Herndl, this 
issue) that achieve the miracle of reference and the alliances of quasi-
objects and quasi-subjects that make reality are the result(s) of 
persuasion. And that rhetoric has some useful ways of explaining how 
those transformations and alliances get made.   
Some who have worked with scientists and engineers on funded 
projects have found themselves unwillingly positioned as public relations 
agents, tasked with selling an agenda determined by others to a 
(sometimes justifiably) resistant public; this is a role where the critical 
position is not welcome—I’ve been in this position myself, as have others 
in this field. An NSF IGERT grant at my university (on which Bill Kinsella 
is a co-PI) focusing on genetic engineering and society involves 
humanities graduate students along with those in the natural and social 
sciences, but the rhetoric student in this program must guard against 
being cast in the role of logographer.2 Projects like this that address 
problems of pest management, disease prevention, and ecosystem 
deterioration challenge our role as critics but offer the opportunity to 
bring rhetorical arts to bear in a consequential way. Such projects thus 
                                                        
2 For more information on the Integrative Graduate Education and 
Research Traineeship, see http://www.nsf.gov/crssprgm/igert/intro.jsp. 
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raise more questions: What should the curriculum be for an “embedded” 
rhetoric student, such as those who will be working in the School of 
Sustainability at USF or those in the IGERT program at NC State? Who 
sets research agendas? Can we and should we maintain a distinction 
between basic and applied research?  
In research settings such as these, Ceccarelli maintains that ARST 
scholars have something distinctive to offer: “improved public 
communication of science and technology” (this issue). But Herndl’s 
vision is different, offering yet another challenge to ARST. Although the 
set of questions at the end of the paper outline a challenging and 
productive research agenda, the citations demonstrate only weak 
connections to rhetorical studies. This may be our failing. However, it 
may also suggest that the research agenda is one for “science studies” 
more broadly and not one for ARST particularly. If our aim should be to 
“do science” (Herndl, this issue), do we give up the critical stance 
altogether? Does rhetoric lose its identity as a distinct discipline?  
Another Horizon 
I was somewhat surprised that none of these papers mentions new 
communication technologies, since they seem to shape so much 
speculation about the future in other forums, whether academic, civic, or 
commercial. It seems important to put this set of phenomena on our 
agenda for the future. For example, the proposal for Alan Gross and 
Jonathan Buehl’s collection-in-progress on Science and the Internet 
offered this rationale:  
…the Internet has utterly transformed the ways in which science 
is practiced, produced, and proliferated. But while rhetoricians of 
science have enlightened us concerning the structure and nature 
of the scientific article as it existed up to the end of the twentieth 
century, they have yet to come to terms with its twenty-first 
century counterparts, communicative forms evolving so rapidly 
that it is difficult to capture them in flight. (personal 
communication) 
This collection contends not only that rhetorical forms of science are 
changing but that science itself is undergoing change perhaps as profound 
as the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, which took shape in the 
shadow of the printing press. Authors in this collection will be exploring 
changed boundaries between science and its publics, evolving scientific 
and public genres, new procedures of peer review, open access, data 
visualization, new possibilities for public communication.  
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